The entire world knows that the Sahara affair is the aftermath of Spanish colonialism. The latter benefited from some sort of a "privilege" compared to the French Protectorate in so far as it occupied several portions of the Moroccan territory, north and south alike.
There is yet another particularity that came to be grafted on this situation soon after Morocco's independence back in 1956. It is the fact that Spanish colonisation has not disappeared completely for that. Spain could pull out of the cities of Tarfaya, Ifni and the Sahara territory only after Morocco had recovered, albeit only partially, its sovereignty, that is, in 1958, 1969 and 1975, respectively.
These are generally familiar issues. On the international plane, however, what is not quite familiar for the non-specialists, and above all for young people under thirty years of age, is that this question does not go back to just yesterday (UN Plan of September 1988); it dates back to the beginnings of the Sixties. We offer then to recall, in broad terms, this long period by distinguishing at least six major phases: (1966-74; 1975-80; 1981-84; 1985-91; 1992-2006 and ever since 2007) regrouped into two time-frames: 1966-1984 and 1985-2007.
I. The first period: 1966-1984
The recall of this period, which stretches over a period of nearly twenty years, will attempt to lay stress upon the treatment of the Sahara affair, first by the United Nations and later by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). We will then identify three major phases: 1966-1974, 1975-1980, and 1981-1984.
A. The first phase: 1966-1974
Before we can proceed any further, it is not superfluous to recall here that the question of the city of Ifni and the WesternSahara has been raised before the General Assembly (henceforth GA) ever since 1963 (item 23 of this year's agenda), which Assembly charged a Special Commission to examine this particular question in light of Resolution 1514, of 1960 relative to the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, and to advance concrete proposals during the next Session.
The Special Commission carried out its mission within the deadline that was set for it, by presenting its Report accompanied with a project for a resolution that won the support of 21 African and Arab States, a report that made mention of its dissatisfaction with the slowness that Spain made use of so as to put in place Resolution 1514 (XV).
In 1965, the GA adopted the proposals of the Special Commission by exhorting Spain to take, within the briefest deadlines, the measures that are imperative for the liberation of the territories still under its rule, and to start the negotiations relative to the devolution of sovereignty concerning these territories (Ifni and Sahara).
However, as of the year 1966, the date at which begins the study of the phase under consideration, Spain has proposed that the Sahara affair be dissociated from that of Ifni, all the while manifesting a readiness to retrocede this city. Meanwhile, as far as the Sahara is concerned, it put forth yet another approach, that of self-determination. The GA Resolution, dated December 12, 1966, came in to ratify this proposal, which Morocco accepted while making the precision that "there are yet conditions to be met so that the Sahrawi populations could achieve their self-determination." The Resolution equally solicited the Secretary General to designate a special delegation which would go over to theSahara in order to see to what degree the United Nations could contribute to the preparation and organisation of a referendum.
In its acceptance to dissociate the affairs connected with Ifni and those of the Sahara, Morocco had thought it was on the right track, for it gauged that self-determination was the sole means that could lead to the liberation of the Sahara from under the yoke of colonialism and, by the same token, would have it return to the mother-land. In fact, Morocco did not accept such a situation with a heart of joy, the reason being that the GA Resolution solicited Spain to take all the necessary measures by way of organising the referendum in concert not only with Morocco, but also with Mauritania (which had also formulated some claims in this area) as well as all the parties concerned; that is to say, Algeria, a country bordering the Sahara territory.
The dissociation operation had not left much elbow room for Morocco; it had henceforth to compose, so to say, with its neighbours, and what is more, those with whom it was in bad terms: owing to the 1963 "Sand War" against Algeria, and in view of the latter's irredentist position vis-à-vis Mauritania, which was then not yet recognised by Morocco despite its admission to the United Nations in 1961.
A situation such as this could only encourage Spain in its hedging practices. Spain in fact exploited thus the divergences obtaining between Morocco and its neighbours of the South and the West, despite the efforts deployed by Morocco by way of coming closer to the latter: the meetings of Ifrane and Tlemcen with Algeria in 1969; the recognition of Mauritania in 1970; the 1972 African Summit in Rabat, which registered the reconciliation of Morocco and Algeria as regards the issue of borders, and finally the 1973 Agadir Summit between the three Maghrebi Heads of State (the late King Hassan II, President Houari Boumédiane and President Mokhtar Ould Daddah).
The year 1974 was to uncover thereabout, and in open daylight, the bad intentions that Spain was harbouring. Spain indeed declared its willingness, after having "created" the Polisario in the month of May 1973, to organise the referendum in the Sahara that it was occupying. Seeing this position as being nothing short of a dilatory manoeuvre that seeks to definitively create an independent State under Spain's influence, Morocco, in concert with Mauritania, requested that the GA submit the dossier to the International Court of Justice (henceforth ICJ) so that the latter could respond, through an advisory opinion, to the following two pivotal questions:
1. Was Western Sahara at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?
If the answer to the first question is in negative,
2. What were the ties between this territory and the Kingdom Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?
The ICJ rendered an advisory opinion on October 16, 1975, and this is precisely when the second phase begins.
B. The second phase: 1975-1980
What was the quintessence of this advisory opinion? The fact is that it comprised essentially two aspects:
1. Some historical relations existed between, on the one hand, Morocco and Mauritania and the Sahara, on the other, which relations showed as follows:
As regards Morocco, these were relations of allegiance of the populations of the Sahara to the Kings (Sultans) of Morocco;
As regards Mauritania, some property and rights pertain to the land.
2. These relations of allegiance (Morocco), however, and these property and rights (Mauritania) are not incompatible with the principle of self-determination.
It is fitting here to lay stress on the fact that the court had given its ruling of "ultra petita" in so far as it was not solicited to make any pronouncements on the question of self-determination.
Secure in its knowledge of the ICJ recognition of its historical and juridical rights (because allegiance; or bay'a in Arabic is a notion of Muslim right which involves and leads to personal and territorial competence), Morocco refuses, as far as it is concerned, the principle of self-determination and therefore the referendum; it considers the question as a matter of decolonisation, and hence imbricated, as it were, within the framework of its endeavour towards completing its independence. Morocco then organised the "Green March" (November 1975) which culminated in the conclusion of a tripartite Agreement (November 14, 1975) with Spain and Mauritania in terms of which the old occupier would pull out of the Saharan territory.
The immediate developments of the Sahara affair did not fail to spark off divisions within the GA itself. In fact, in December 1975, the GA adopted two Resolutions, both of which reaffirm the principle of self-determination, the only exception being that one (Resolution 38/54/B) takes into consideration the tripartite Madrid Accord and hence leans towards the Moroccan thesis, but the other one (Resolution 38/54/A) disregards this Accord and therefore takes sides for the adverse thesis, that of Algeria.
Considering that this affair could arrive at a an adequate solution within a regional Organisation, the UN, as can been seen in Articles 52 and 53 of its Charter, preferred to "waive itself" of this dossier by transferring it, through the Resolution of November 8, 1977, to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, currently African Union (AU)).
That was in reality an "ember," as it were, that the UN had handed over to the OAU, above all at a moment (1976) when the Polisario solicited this latter to recognise it as a Liberation Movement. This is to say that the 1976-1980 period witnessed some intense diplomatic activity within the OAU, which was characterised by some manoeuvres and developments that paved the way for three differing phases:
1. A phase of ambiguity, which coincided with the OAU Summits of Port-Louis (Mauritius, 1976), Libreville (Gabon, 1977) and of Khartoum (Sudan, 1978). The activism characterising Algerian diplomacy in connection with a certain number of African States gestured towards the recognition of the Polisario as a national Liberation Movement as well as the withdrawal of the "foreign forces" of the "occupied" Sahara. However, faced with the opposition shown by Morocco and Mauritania, the Conference of Heads of State and governments preferred to privilege the path of negotiation, and decided to meet for an extraordinary Session in order to achieve a just and durable solution. However, for failure to hold this session within the time limits set for it, notably because of the unyielding positions of Algeria, on the one hand, and Morocco and Mauritania, on the other, the Conference of Heads of State and governments resolved, in a gesture towards staying clear of an aborted meeting owing to the position of one and the other, to create the ‘Commission of the Wise' which was tasked to ponder over this question and submit a report at the projected extraordinary Summit. The strong moments of this diplomatic ballet were the following.
The non-recognition of the Polisario as a National Liberation Movement;
The creation of "SADR;"
The affirmation by the Conference of Ministers (June 1976) of the right to self-determination for the "Sahrawipeople", a position which the Conference of Heads of State and government-which is the supreme body of the Organisation-did not consider to be opportune enough to be ratified;
The creation of an ad hoc Commission, later to be called "the Commission of the Wise," which consisted of the Heads of State of six countries: Sudan, Mali, Guinea, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Tanzania, a Commission that was mandated to examine all the data relative to the question of the "Western Sahara" and to submit a report at " an extraordinary session at the level of the Heads of State with the participation of the "people" of the Sahara, with a view to achieving a just and durable solution to the problem." (Res. AHG/ 81, XIII).
2. A phase of extremism which corresponded to the Summit of Monrovia (1979). Through the report of the Commission of the Wise, one wished to force Morocco's hand, as it were, a fact which the latter refused in a categorical way. This Summit made the following proposals:
To consider that the tripartite Madrid Accord transferred the administration of the territory, not sovereignty;
To reaffirm the right of "Sahrawi people" to self-determination;
To create a special Commission in charge of studying the modalities of organising the referendum in collaboration with the United Nations;
To request that Morocco withdraw its administration as well as its military forces.
Morocco, however, rejected both the Resolutions of the Monrovia Summit and the recommendations that were made by the Special Commission. In order to defuse this tie-up, and deadlocked, situation, the United Nations took care to effect a return to moderation when it undertook its work on subsequent resolutions.
3. A phase of moderation which corresponded to the Freetown Summit (Sierra Léone, July 1-4, 1980). At the opening of the latter, the prevalent impression was that the recognition and; therefore, the admission of "SADR" was an acquisition in so far as the condition of simple majority (26 States out of 50) was fulfilled. Morocco, however, raised a question of prejudicial interpretation, putting thus the Conference of Heads of State and government on guard against whatever hasty decisions which would be such as to violate the provisions of the Organisation Charter.
This prejudicial question was formulated as follows:
"The Moroccan delegation, having learnt that a request for admission made by the so-called "SADR" would have been deposited with the Secretary General of our Organisation, considers that it is it our duty to draw your attention to the provisions of Article 28 of the Charter, which appears to be targeted by the application.
Without delaying our contest of the procedure adopted and the qualifications requisite for making such an application, please allow us to point out that Article 28 clearly stipulates that for a State to be admitted, it needs to be independent and sovereign. This, moreover, only confirms the provisions of Article 4 of the Charter, which stipulates that "every independent and sovereign African State can become a member of the Organisation."
This is why we ask that you kindly take into consideration the fact that the provisions of Article 27 be complied with, provisions which stipulate that "every provision relative to the interpretation of the Charter ought to be acquired by a majority of 2/3 of Heads of State and government that are members of the Organisation." It is worth recalling here that this request was made by M'hammed Boucetta, who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Though it had a fundamentally judicial nature, this prejudicial question had the merit of putting and in a judicious manner so, the problem within its political dimension. In fact, in view of this lacunae-bearing aspect of the Charter as regards the procedure of admission, and in the absence of a judicial body that would have given an advisory opinion in connection with the question, the answer to the prejudicial question put forth by Morocco rested, under the terms of Article 27, with the supreme authority (the Conference of Heads of State and government) which - and here is the crux of it all-would adjudicate the question in function of political orientations and affinities.
Note that the founders of the OAU did not deem it necessary to institute a preliminary exam for admission by the principal bodies of the Organisation along the same line of the United Nations, for instance (Art.3-admission by the GA upon the recommendation of the Security Council, or that of that of the League of Arab States (Art.1-admission submitted to the Council of the League). They also did not envisage an admission on the basis of reinforced majority, as is the case for the Organisation for Islamic Conference, for example (Art. 8-admission by the Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs by 2/3 majority decision). Having had as an objective of priority the liberation of the continent, the OAU rather wished to ease the entry within the Organisation of a greater number of States (simple majority), the one condition being that these States be independent and sovereign and that they make note of their intention to adhere to the Charter to the General Secretary. The latter will then pass on a copy of the request to the member States which will express, on an individual basis, their take on the recognition. Once the number of recognitions is attained, the Secretary General relays the information to the Candidate State.
It is necessary to note here that, in addition to "the confusion between recognition and decision in the area of admission," the Charter had envisaged no procedure that aims at checking the existence of all the required conditions (Independence and Sovereignty) for it decide on admission, neither did it put in place any controlling bodies that would be tasked with appraising the acts of the Secretary General on the matter.
It is amidst this "deleterious" ambiance that Resolution AHG/118 (XII) was adopted, a Resolution which, in ignoring the request made by the Polisario (request for admission) and eluding the prejudicial question put forth by Morocco, left the question relative to the admission of "SADR" pending and therefore frozen. In consequence, the OAU asked the ad hoc Commission to continue to operate under the aegis of the OAU President, and "deploy all effort towards reconciling the parties in conflict, and achieving a pacifist as durable solution to this question."
C. The third phase: 1981-1984
The Nairobi Summit (June 1981) came to witness a reversal in the Moroccan position. The late King, His Majesty Hassan II, came all the way to personally attend the meeting. He declared then that Morocco had accepted the organisation of the referendum after having considered, up until then, that the Sahara dossier was closed after Morocco had recovered its despoiled territory.
What were the reasons that pushed Morocco to make such a reversal of opinion? Three reasons are in order here:
1. There is, to begin with, the reconciling moves of the OAU:
The refusal to ratify the principle of self-determination as the sole solution for the settlement of the conflict (Port Louis Summit, 1976 and Khartoum 1978).
Despite the radical proposals made by the ad hoc Commission, the Monrovia Resolutions (1979), did not only make any mention of the Polisario (the texts spoke rather of the representatives of the Western Sahara), but also avoided to ask for the evacuation of the Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania. An injunction such as this one would not have been "illogical" with the spirit that was prevalent throughout the Summit. It is true that the Special Commission would later make the request to Morocco (December 1979), but only with regards to the southern part which the latter (Morocco, that is) came to recover after the departure of the Mauritanians, following an Agreement with the Polisario (August 4, 1979).
The Freetown Summit (July 1980) purely and simply reproduced the Resolutions made in the Monrovia Summit, for it noticed that peace in the Sahara could not be had without Morocco, nor was it possible against its will.
2. There is also, and above all, the pending (and therefore deadlocked) state of admission relative to "SADR," following the prejudicial question put forth by Morocco.
3. There are finally the requests made by a certain number of friendly Arab and European States towards Morocco in view to having it adopt a certain degree of flexibility in this respect. The Moroccan political officials responded to those requests in a favourable manner "so that no one would say that Morocco has become an obstacle in the way to African unity, or that it holds up the path of the dynamic policy that Africa has to undertake."
What can be said about Morocco's acceptance to organise a referendum?
It was both a grievous and prudent acceptance.
Grievous, because this amounted to organising, upon a territory which henceforth belonged to it, a referendum so that it would ask the populations-- which had in the recent past (1976- for Saguiet El Hamra, and 1979 for Oued Eddahab), took an oath of allegiance to the King of Morocco-whether they wished to continue to be Moroccan; or if, on the contrary, they preferred to distance themselves away from the mother-land, under which circumstance they would opt for independence.
Prudent, in view of the intransigence of Morocco on the guarantees that it deemed to be necessary for the referendum operation not to ineluctably culminate, in one way or another, exclusively to the solution of independence. In fact, the Spanish census of 1974 was certainly a basis of reference that had somehow to be up-dated, but one had also to take into consideration the thousands of Moroccan Sahrawi people who had fled Spanish repression, and who have, ever since 1958, built their homes in the north of Morocco, in fact in quite precise cities-as if out of group (or tribe) solidarity. Is it then because Morocco holds on to the fact that any person who is a native of the Sahara and who has, by the same token, the right to vote, could express themselves during the referendum that we would rate this country for taking recourse to shilly-shallying and to procrastination? The least that one could say in this respect is that this accusation is unjust, unfounded and tendentious.
The executive Commission that was put in place by the Nairobi I Summit held a meeting in August 1981 to examine the modalities of implementing the referendum. However, in the course of this meeting, Algeria returned to the attack, so to say, so as to propose the withdrawal of the Moroccan forces, and the start of negotiations with the Polisario. In the face of such tendentious manoeuvres, negotiations came to a stall. Worse still, during this meeting, Eden Kodjo, then Secretary General, had invited "SADR" to partake of the works, even though that was a much more technical session, as it was devoted to the financial problems of the Organisation.
Morocco then refused this intrusion on the part of the Polisario, which intrusion narrowly led to the rupture of the African Organisation between, on the one hand, the partisans of Morocco and those of Algeria and the Polisario, on the other. Such an act by the Secretary General even impeded the meeting of the Tripoli Summit (summer 1982).
Things remained the same up to the convening of the 1983 Addis Abeba Summit, which exhorted Morocco to start direct negotiations with the Polisario. Morocco then formulated reservations concerning the interpretation of the expression "the parties concerned"; namely, Morocco and the Polisario. It held on to this position up to the XX Summit (Addis Abebi, 1984) during which it withdrew from the OAU once the latter admitted "SADR" as a full-scale member. It was then considered that as long as Morocco was no longer a member of the OAU, and that the latter was seen to have taken sidesvis-à-vis the question of the Sahara, it would from then on be the prerogative of an authority other than the OAU-which became both a judge and a party-to watch over the organisation of a referendum, and that this authority, as Moroccan officials saw it, was nothing short of the United Nations itself.
II. The second period: 1985-2007
All during this period, it is the UN that takes in charge the Sahara dossier. There again, we come to witness differing phases that have registered a certain accumulation at the level of normative; or rather, "propositional" production. Here again, we also distinguish three phases: 1985-1991; 1992-2006, ever since 2007.
A. The first phase: 1985-1991
Morocco pulled out of OAU while courageously considering the fact that it would honour the commitments it took at the same time in Nairobi I and Nairobi II as well as in the United Nations; namely, the organisation of a referendum.
Likewise, it reconsidered the reproach for partiality that it made to the OAU, and accepted that the latter be put to beneficial use so that it would play a complementary role side by side with the UN. All of this is done so that no one would say that Morocco seeks to mount obstacles in the way of organising a referendum.
It was thus that towards the end of the year 1985 and the dawn of the year 1986, the UN mediation, through the work and sustained efforts of the Secretary General (SG), got initiated in collaboration with the OAU.
The strong moments of this phase can be summed up as follow:
March-May 86: Invitation by the UN General Secretary of Morocco and the Polisario for separate negotiations à propos of the conditions surrounding cease-fire and the organisation of a referendum. Algeria and Mauritania were also present as observers;
1987: The on-site dispatching of a technical commission (to the Sahara, to Tindouf as well as to Rabat, Algeria and Nouakchott);
1988: The elaboration of a global Peace Plan of settlement to which the concerned parties had to provide answers prior to the first of September of the same year. In September 1988, Resolution 621 of the Security Council endorses the Peace plan, and designates Gros Espiell as the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General to theSahara.
1990: Three important events took place:
May: the constitution of an Identification Commission to proceed with voter registration, and to up-date the 1974 census;
June: The drafting of Resolution 658 of the Security Council endorsing the SG report which comprises the integral text of the proposals relative to the settlement as have been approved of by the parties concerned on August 30, 1988. It is on the basis of this report that the Mission of the United Nations for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established.
End of June: During a meeting with the UN Secretary General, the two parties accepted to start a cease-fire as of September 6, 1991.
B. The second phase : 1992-2006
Once the plan was accepted and adopted by the parties, it was then necessary to move on to the stage of implementation. Things, however, were not that easy:
Firstly, owing to the practical difficulties inherent to the realisation of the UN-initiated process (notably the divergence of interpretation in connection with the electorate eligible to participate in the vote, the question of appeal proceedings against the decisions of the Identification Commission as well as the period for the return of "refugees".).
Secondly, owing to the positions held by the parties concerned, notably Algeria which did not appear to be ready to depart from its role of a concerned as well as an involved party.
The efforts deployed by the UN Secretary General to come to terms with his difficulties: London meeting, Houston meeting of 1997 and later that of London, June 2000, all of which were not crowned with any success. This is all to say the ‘balance sheet' of nearly a dozen years (1991-2000) was quite meagre.
It is noteworthy here that during the London meeting, the SG Special Envoy solicited the two parties to "to consider other ways of achieving durable solutions to this dispute."
Following the accession to the throne by his Majesty Mohammed VI, Morocco proposed to the other party; namely, the Polisario, during a meeting in Berlin (September 28, 2000) that an open and constructive dialogue be launched in order to try and come to a political solution within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty and the respect for territorial integrity, all through decentralisation and regionalisation channels.
Meanwhile, the United Nations, seeing that there was no solution in the offing, tilted towards abandoning the Plan for settlement altogether. It was thus that Kofi Annan came to ask James Baker to examine the possibility of a compromise. Hence, in 2001, the SG Special Envoy, James Baker, presented an "outline-agreement" on the status of the Western Sahara" which aims at conferring upon the Sahara a greater autonomy which should culminate in "a referendum on the status of the Sahara (which) will be organised with qualified voters at a date convened by the parties to the present agreement, and in the five years following the first acts marking its application."
Endorsed as it is by Morocco, this project would be rejected by the Polisario, which continues to support the self-determination referendum.
In 2003, the SG Special Envoy came upon the scene with a Baker Plan II, denominated the "Peace Plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara."
If this plan was accepted by the Polisario and Algeria, it was rejected by Morocco, on the one hand, in view of the exorbitant powers that were conferred by the text upon the governmental authority in the Sahara at the detriment of Morocco and, on the other hand, because of the provisional four to five year period at the close of which a referendum has of necessity to take place.
And even though this plan included the two options of independence and autonomy as well as the integration to Morocco, Morocco did not accept it; the plan was considered to be a "swindle", because it would have made it quite easy for the governmental authority in the Sahara to shape up and manipulate as it pleases public opinion during this period in such a way as to have the independence option triumph over the rest. We would have come then to the solution of "winner takes all" (sic); which had never been quite the spirit of negotiations held until then.
In a gesture towards countering the Baker Plan II, Morocco then presented a "Project of Autonomy Statute" for the "Autonomous Region of the Sahara". And having had no favourable echoes as a result, Morocco came again upon the scene in 2007 to make yet another new proposal, "the Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region."
We thus find ourselves in the thick of the third and last phase.
C. The third phase: since 2007
The Moroccan Initiative, which was presented on April 11, 2007 anticipates a large autonomy statute for the Sahararegion, endowing as matter of fact the populations concerned with substantial competencies both at the institutional level (a parliament, an executive branch and proper jurisdiction) and at the financial as well as resource allocation levels (tax-levying; taxes and territorial contributions decreed by the competent authorities of the Region; the revenues earmarked to the region for natural resource exploitation; a part of the revenues from natural resources situated in the Region and collected by the State; revenues proceeding from the Region's patrimony as well as national solidarity).
Of course, the State will preserve its competencies in the areas pertaining to Royal prerogatives (Defence, Foreign Relations, the constitutional and religious attributions of the King).
This Autonomy Statute, around which negotiations with the Polisario will revolve, will be submitted, so that it be in conformity with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter, to a referendary consultation of the concerned populations. This consultation will constitute the free exercise, by these populations, of the right to self-determination.
The Resolution 1754 of the Security Council, dated on April 30, 2007, has highlighted the "serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution." It is incumbent that we note here, albeit in passing, that this Resolution has simply "taken note" of the "proposition" made by the Polisario on April 10, 2007.
The first meeting was held on June 18 and 19 in Manhasset in the environs of New York.
According to the report of the UN Secretary General, this first meeting unfolded, in the words of the Special Envoy, Peter Van Walsun, in a "positive climate" and that "this would not suffice to bring to fruition a negotiation process."
Here then is a broad outline of the political evolution of the question of the Sahara on the international plane. We hope that the dynamics of Manhasset will offer a chance for the definitive settlement of this question, which does nothing but poison Maghrebi relations, thereby putting off indefinitely the edification of Maghreb Arab Union (UMA), an ensemble which is called upon to constitute a very appreciable resort for the Maghreb States in the era of globalisation and regional regroupings.
Professor-Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdallah University, Fez