The strong man of the Algerian regime general Mohamed Mediène, alias Tewfik, head of the powerful DRS (Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité), has been ordered into retirement, at the height of his power within the army and popularity among many people, who view him, first, as the true symbol of stability of the country and, second, as the next president capable of holding ebullient and unstable Algeria together.
This done, one wonders quite rightly whether this "political coup" directed at the powerful army, that, was in the past and still is the main inspiration and the sole power behind the throne, is the work of the incapacitated President Bouteflika himself, the presidential staff headed by the powerful President's brother Said or the core army nomenclature represented by the chief of staff general Gaid Saleh, who has many things to settle with general Tewfik?
The answer is neither straightforward nor simple in opaque Algeria that is reminiscent of its long-time ally and patron Russia, in its old Soviet configuration. The power struggle is fierce, especially when the opponents feel, with much strength, that probably the end of the regime is at hand. So the players want to get the most material benefits from it before is too late.
For France 24, the dismissal of General Tewfik shows, with no shadow of doubt, that Bouteflika is still the boss of “Algeria Inc.”:[i]
« Algeria’s shadowy and powerful intelligence supremo has been “retired” by the country’s President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in a move that confirms the head of state's domination over the country’s armed forces.
Dubbed “kingmaker” because of his 25-year tenure as head of the DRS intelligence services, General Mohamed Mediene saw five presidents and a dozen prime ministers come and go. He was also known as “Rab Dzayer”, which means “God of Algeria”. »
This sudden volt-face of Bouteflika against the faithful guardian of his temple, General Tewfik, can only be explained by two probabilities:
1- The army top brass made of the seven core generals and the fifty powerful commanders are scared to death for their life and privileges if this man assumes power on the death of the president bearing in mind that he has files on each one of them, and he would certainly blackmail them to require allegiance or face public dishonor. Feeling danger coming their direction, they bore pressure on the president to get rid of him while in power and while alive.
2- The second probability, in the case of future popular uprising General Tewfik might be acclaimed by the populace and Bouteflika chastised, which would be a sad end of this man's reign, a man who brokered a difficult peace and reconciliation with the Islamists and brought a new era of prosperity for the country.
However, the opposition and secular Berber party Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD) is very skeptical of these changes, and does not see them leading to the much-hoped for democracy, but just more of the same, whereby different clients of the establishment are in total clannish feuds for more power within the system and consequently more benefits:[ii]
« La logique des appétits claniques… ne clôt en rien les luttes dans le sérail…Il ne peut signifier une quelconque amorce d’un Etat civil tant espéré. Bien au contraire, il confirme l’emprise des sectes sur les institutions politiques. Le système politique, qui a ruiné le pays, s’apprête à renouveler son diktat au détriment de la souveraineté du peuple algérien»
Since the president suffered his first heart attack and was hurriedly transported to a French hospital for medical care in total secrecy, various powerful groups have been vying, in the dark, for the favors of the powerful army to win the honor of selection for the position of president, to no avail. The nimble President Bouteflika, though weakened by illness and obliged to use a wheelchair for mobility and Skype for mass communication, seems to still hold the power firmly and enjoy the confidence of the army. Why is that?
During the civil war (1992-1999) that ensued the annulment by the army of legislative elections win of the Islamist party FIS and which resulted in the death of more than 150, 000 people,[iii] the majority of which were attributed to the army, with the intent of terrorizing the population and inciting them against the popular Islamist political group Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). This violence tarnished the image of the army in the eyes of the Algerians.
Realizing the extent of their unpopularity, the army wanted a civilian president to mop up aptly the blood they spilled cheaply and ruthlessly and they wanted, also, a man with political experience, a clean slate and charisma and it so happened that Bouteflika fit very well the profile. He was an acclaimed minister of foreign affairs during the era of the late socialist Boumedienne (1965-1978). On the death of his political mentor, he went into self-imposed exile in the Gulf region where he served as political advisor to Gulf heads of states for quite a while, in total self-effacement.
The fire next time
Algeria’s economy depends to almost 90 % on earnings from oil revenues and like many oil-producing countries in the MENA region, has set up a huge rentier state that serves as a means of buying social peace disguised into the so-called policy of even distribution of wealth but aiming, in the end, at perpetuating the absolutist regime, tightly controlled by the omnipresent army.
In this peculiar set-up, half of the oil revenues go to the secret Swiss bank accounts of the top brass of the army, who consider themselves the sole and legitimate inheritors of the Algerian independence. All in all, they are ready to use force, if necessary, as they did with the Islamists, in the past, to safeguard their material benefits in the name of the concept they created prior to independence, to keep power, even by using brutal tactics: “revolutionary violence.”
As the oil prices are dwindling on the world oil market rapidly, Algeria will soon face difficult options. Initially, it will probably make use of the sovereign fund to maintain the social status quo, but once it is depleted, it will have no other alternative but to opt out for hard choices of realpolitik: cut the subsidies.
This perilous act has indeed been preceded in the last few months by putting stringent conditions on car-importing which led to diplomatic outcry from European countries like Germany, whose manufactured vehicles were denied entry to the Algerian market.
In Algeria, everything is subsidized by the state from medicine to housing, attempting to cut the subsidies will amount to political suicide because the rank and file will argue that the military are denying them a birthright while they themselves indulge unashamedly.
As they will start feeling the pinch of economic reality, the Algerians will take to the street en masse to denounce their government’s policy, initially this will lead to scuffles with the police force but with time it will go crescendo into an uprising as more localities through the country will join the fray.
According to the Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal speaking at the meeting of the official think-tank Conseil national économique et social (CNES) on September 19, 2015:[iv]
«La baisse brutale des cours des hydrocarbures impacte les ressources de notre pays. Il s’agit de 33 à 35 milliards de dollars en moins sur l’ensemble de l’année 2015»
He goes on to state shyly and in disguised terms the forthcoming probable dismantling of the subsidies to reduce public expenditure:
«En décembre 2014, le chef de l’Etat avait fixé le cap de la réponse nationale à la contraction des revenus pétroliers : rationaliser les dépenses, mieux maîtriser le commerce extérieur et les flux de capitaux et poursuivre le développement socioéconomique du pays.»
If the Arab Spring did not occur in Algeria few years ago it is because the people had in the back of the mind the atrocities of the civil war and wanted voluntarily to spare their country another blood-spilling episode, so they shied from taking to the streets. Now, the situation is different, it is about survival, if they cannot have subsidies, then they would want all-out democracy, instead.
The Algerian potential spring
The Algerian police force is estimated at 130,000, it is under the command of Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale (DGSN) itself headed by the Ministry of the Interior, and it is charged of maintaining law and order in urban areas in addition of other police routines.[v] In the countryside, the police duties are discharged by theGendarmerie Nationale, whose forces are estimated at 60,000 and is directly related to the Ministry of Defense and acts also as a versatile paramilitary force.[vi]
In the 1988 riots, the two polices in question, the urban and the rural were surpassed by the events and the state had to call in the army to quell the popular discontent with, of course, all the unpleasant results of such an undertaking.
The Algerian army is the true power in Algeria since its creation in 1962 at the end of the liberation war against the French, it is known as the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP) formerly the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). The Algerian armed forces number 130,000 troops (army 110,000, navy 6,000, air force 14,000).
In the case of a probable uprising that could ultimately happen in the next two years, the discontent will go national, in a matter of days, because cutting the subsidies will be severing the sacrosanct bloodline and for the ordinary Algerian it is the honor, a concept of manhood and virility known as nif that would call for revenge and blood-spilling.
The army was trained to defend the integrity of the country against foreign enemies and terrorists willing to overthrow the regime in the name of creed or ethnicity. Besides, in the case of a potential faceoff, the army would be asked to use live ammunition to quell the uprising, but for how long? In the long run, the soldiers will defect to the people and fight the establishment and it could easily become another civil war but, this time, it is the people against the army and the winner will be the people, undoubtedly. Of course nobody knows how long this could last and what price would both sides pay for it?
This uprising, if it happens when it happens, will certainly lead to many important and salient changes in the future of Algeria:
1- The end of the supremacy of the army in politics and economics and its return to the barracks, once for all, to undertake its primordial and only role, that of the defense of the integrity and independence of Algeria;
2- Democracy will, more likely, bring back to power the very Islamists that were kicked out by a military coup in 1991 because they are the only organized and regimented political alternative power to fill in the vacuum;
3- Algeria will open up to the world politically and economically; and
4- Algeria will initiate a new era of cooperation and understanding with its immediate neighbors, especially Morocco with whom it has been estranged over the Sahara issue since the Green March in 1975.
Questions and more questions
At this point, the future of Algeria is grim and uncertain; there is an urgent need for immediate and radical change in politics and economics to avoid future probable uprising and upheaval. It is a well-known fact that bread comes before democracy[vii] but if the establishment cannot anymore give them somewhat free bread then they will go for democracy, for good, no matter what the price to pay would be.
- Would the revolution rock the Algerian Kasbah soon?
- Would the Islamists lead again the street protests and ultimately come to the helm of the country?
- Will the army remain neutral like in Egypt or shoot its own people?
- Will the uprising embolden the Amazigh to declare unilaterally their autonomy or even independence?
- Will the turmoil push thousands of Algerians to become refugees in France and Europe and exacerbate the local European population further more?
- What will the reaction of the neighboring countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Mali and Niger be?
- What will happen to the orphaned Polisario Front, will it die out?